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Abstract
In this paper we analyse the effect of corporate tax rate policy as an
instrument to achieve more employment. A low level of corporate tax rate
gives the f'irm more opportunities to invest atid to create jobs, but on the
other hand a high level of corporate tax rate increases the number of
people working in the public sector. So there is a certain trade off be-
tween employment in the private sector and in the public sector. We apply
a differential game framework to analyse this trade off and pay attention
to differeizt solution concepts (open-loop and feedback Stackelberg and
Pareto). After comparing the results we can draw the conclusion that cre-
dibility and reputation play an important role in the effectivity of gov-
ernmental employment policy.
1. Introduction
One of the important objectives of governmental policy nowadays is to
lower the level of unemployment. Confronted with the high level of unem-
ployment the government searches for instruments to achieve this goal. An
important question in this respect is: should the government create jobs
itselF or should it let the firm create jobs. Assuming that governmental
plans for employment will be financed by tax payments through the firm,
the case of employment plans leaves less money for the firm to invest.
Because of this lower level of investment there will be less growth of
capital good stock and in the neo-classical framework less employment. So
there is a certain trade off between employment created by the government
and by tlie firm and the government's decision about the tax policy is
affected by the iirvestment policy of the firm..r....~-. `
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In this paper we present a model for the firm, where the firm needs
labour and capital for production and has to decide whether to invest its
money after paying wages back into the firm or to pay out dividend. The
firm has to reckon with the corporate tax policy of the government, which
will be used as an instrument to achieve the governmental goal: employ-
ment. Because of the fact that the actions of one player will influence
the outcome for the other , the class of differential game models seems to
be a suitable framework for this problem. In a differential game different
solution concepts and information structures (open-loop and feedback) are
possible.
In section 2 we present the model for the case the firm operates under
constant returns to scale. In section 3 the solutions for the dífferent
solution concepts and their economic interpretation are given. Special
attention is paid to a comparison between open-loop Stackelberg, where the
government commits itself to an announced policy at the beginning of the
planning period, and feedback Stackelberg, where there is no commitment at
all. In section 4 we discuss the case of decreasing returns to scale. In
section 5 we give a numerical example for different parameter values of
the production technique. Finally, in section 6 we make some remarks and
suggestions for future research. In the appendix all technical details can
be found.
2. The Model
As already mentioned in g 1 we will model the problem described in
section 1 as a differential game:
[insert figure 1 here]
Assuming, that the firms can be represented by one, we have two players:
the firm and the government.-3-
2.1. The firm
W~: assume that the firm produces a ho~uogeneous output by means of two
homogeneous inputs: labor and capital goods. Its production function be-
longs to the class of Cobb-Douglas functions:
Q- K~L1-S , 0 ~ b C 1~
where Q: Production
K: capital good stock
L: labour
(1)
The relevant function is linearly homogeneous.
We assume that the amount of capital goods can only be raised by invest-
ment and there is no depreciation:
K(t) - I(t), (2)
where I: investment.
We Further assume that investment can only be financed by retained earn-
ings. The firm brings this product on an output market, where it is faced
with a fixed selling price p. Furthermore the firm has to pay the amount
of labour a fixed wage rate w per unit.
This leads to the following expression for profit:
~(t) - PQ(t) - wL(t). (3)
where 0(t): profit
We assume that the firm behaves as if it maximizes the shareholders' value
of the firm, which consists of the sum of the dividend streams over the
planning period (see Lesourne (19~g), Van Loon (1982)):
T
max f D(t)dt , (4)
I,L 0-4-
in which T : planning horizon
t : time
D(t): dividend
So the firm has to make two decisions: first it has to decide about its
optimal amounY. of labour and second profit after taxation has to be divi-
cled t~e~lwcc~n cjividenci cind invesCment:
0(t) - TX(t) - I(t) t D(t), (5)
in which: TX(t): tax payment
Because of the fact that L(t) does not appear in the system dynamically we
can optimize the objective function statically with respect to L(see
Feichtinger 8~ Hartl (1986)). This leads to:
~Q
p'~L - w (6)
Hence, at every time-point it holds that the marginal revenues of labour
equals marginal costs of labour. In the case of a Cobb-Douglas technique
(6) becomes:
L - b ~Z.K
w (7)
Thus, there is a linear relation between labour and capital and (3) can be
rewritten as
0(t) - (p - w.K)K(t)
~-á 1
- {p. (P 1~~) S - w. (Pw~)b}K(t)
(8)
- q.K(t),-5-
where x: capital output coefficient
a: labour to output coefficient
q: rentability of capital good stock
In the case of constant returns to scale x and a are constants.
2.2. The government
The government's objective is to maximize the employment during the plan-
ning period:
T ,~
max f L (t)dt
z o
(9)
The instrument for the government to achieve this goal is the corporate
tax rate.
The amount of labour exists of two components:
w
L (t) - L(t) t LG(t)
L: Labour working in the private sector
LG: labour working in the public sector
M
L: total amount of labour
(10)
From section 2.1 it follows that the a~uount of employment in the private
sector can be given by:
L(t) - K K(t)
We assume that the wage rates in the public and private sector are the
same and the government will only use its money for paying wages. This
leads to the following relation for employment in the public sector:
LG(t) - Gwt .
where G(t): government spendings.-6-
Furthermore, the government is not able to spend more than it receíves
(i.e. no budgetary deficit) and corporate tax is the only source of income
for the government in this economy:
TX(t) - G(t)
TX(t) - T(t).0(t)
Finally, corporate tax rate is restricted between T1 and T2:
(12)
(13)
o ~ T1 C T(t) ~ T2 C 1, zl ~ T2 (14)
In this model the government has to deal with the following interesting
dilemma: it wai~ts to maximize employment, so it may choose a high level of
corporate tax rate, because in that case there is more money to create
jobs. But az the other hand a high level of corporate tax rate implies
that the firm has less money to invest, which yields less jobs created by
the firm and less future jobs created by the government, because future
tax earnings decrease.
3. The optimal solution
3.1. Introduction
Before we can derive an optimal solution we have to make some assump-
tions about the way that one player will react on an announcement of the
other. Important is also the question whether the player commits itself to
his announced policy or not. We will assume that the government takes into
account the reaction of the firm to the announced tax rate. In section
3.2, where there is no commitment and the players do not cooperate, the
outcome of the formal structure of the interaction between government and
firui corresponds to a feedback Stackelberg dynamic game with the govern-
ment as leader (e.g. Basar and Olsder (1982, sect. 7.3)). In section 3.3
we make the same behavioural assumptions, but now the government and firm
commit theirselves to their announced policy. The outcome of the game-~-
corresponds to an open-loop Stackelberg solution ( e.g. BaSar and Olsder
(19t~2, sec;tion 7.2)). In section 3.4 tlie Pareto case is treated. Here,
goveruwent and firm cooperate and the absence or presence of binding con-
tracts makes no difference.
3.2. The feedback Stackelberg solution
In the appendix we prove that the open-loop Nash solution is a candi-
date for a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. This solution is not diffi-
cult to obtain and is preseiited in table 1 and table 2.
[insert table 1 and 2]
t - T -
x
(15) - (p-wa)(1-T2)
dt ~ 0 dt ~ 0 dt ~ 0 dt ~ 0. dt ) 0
dt~ dp dw da dx
x - w-1 a
t - t } (P-wa)(1-T2) ~n { 2(a.t2(P-wa.))} (16)
In the beginning the government starts to tax at a low rate and the firm
invests at its maximum rate. The reason for the government to ask the low
rate is that more money is left for the fírm to invest, which implies that
future tax earnings and future employment will be greater. The firm in-
vests at its maximum rate in order to be able to pay out more dividend in
the future. At the moment t the firm stops investment and starts paying
out dividend. Because the end of the planning horizon comes nearer the
shareholders are more interested in collecting dividend than in invest-
ment.
In the feedback case the government will always ask the high rate after
time-point t, because the only incentive to ask the low rate is that the
firm lias more money to invest. The only yuestion left is: will ttie govern-
ment switch from high to low rate before or just at the moment that the
a
firm changes its investment policy. If Tz ~ plwa, the government has
lt -
w
already switched before the moment that the firm switches. Stated briefly,-8-
this situation occurs if the final tax rate is small, the labour to output
coefficient is large, the profit per employee, i.e. p-wa, is large or
there is a high level of wage rate.
1-
a
In ttle case that T2 ~ 1 , stopping investment and raising the tax
lt -
w
rate takes place at the same moment. Note that the government wants more
investment (i.e. its shadowprice of capital is greater than one), but it
cannot force the firm to invest.
3.3. Ttie open-loop Stackelberg solution
In appendix 1 we used Pontryagin's maximum principle to derive the solu-
tion for this model. It turns out that is convenient to distinguish the
following three situations:
1-









2) T1 ~ plwa ; Tz
lt -
1-




j) T1 ) plwa : table 4
lt -
w
[insert table 3 and 4]
tl - T - w~l x
dtl dtl dtl dtl dtl dtl
dp ~ ~' dw ~ ~' dx ~ ~' da - dTl - dT2 - ~
t2 - T -




dt2 dt2 dt2 dt2 dt2 dt2
dp ) 0. dil
~ 0. d~r2
C 0, dw ~ 0' da ~ 0' dx ~ 0
1 x
t - T - (p-wa)(1-T1) (19)
1 1 1 1 1
dt ~ 0 dt ~ 0 dt ~ 0~ dt ~ 0 dt ~ 0
dp dil dw da dx
a
Only in the case that i2 ) plwa there is a difference between the
lt -
w
feedback and open-loop situation. It turns out that in the open-loop case
there is more employment and more dividend pay-out. So the results of both
players improve, if open-loop is played. In the open-loop case the firm's
investment period becomes longer (tl)t or tl~t) and there are more capital
goods. The reason for this longer period of investment is that the govern-
ment postpones the application of the high rate, because in this way in-
vesting becomes more attractive for the firm.
So to let create jobs is better than creating jobs. The main difference
is that in the open-loop case a phase with zero investment and low tax
rate is possible, while in the feedback case, because of the absence of
commitment, there is no reason to believe that the government will ask the
low rate if there is no investment. Hence, within the open-loop framework
the government can influence the firm more to increase investment.
3.4. The cooperative outcomes
It can be shown that in general the outcomes of section 3.2 and 3.3 are
inefficient, because there are combinations of investment policy and tax
rate, which result in more employment and dividend pay-out. Pareto-effi-
cient outcomes can be found from maximizing a weighted eum of both objec-
tive functions of firm and government:
T „ T
max f L (t)dt t~ f D(t)dt , 0 C u~ m
I,L,T 0 0
(20)
subject to (1) -(3). (5) -(8) and (10) -(14), where u can be inter-
preted as the bargaining power of the firm against the government.-10-
We distinguish two possible situations, depending on the bargaining
power of the firm against the government. If u~ W, the government is in a
strong bargaining position, because For the 'social planner' one dollar
more employment means more than one dollar dividend. In that case the
solution consists of three phases.
[insert table ,]
1'he structure of this solution is the same as the feedback Stackelberg
1-
a
solution if T2 ( pl`"a. However, the reason for the fact that the in-
- lt -
w
vestmeiit switch takes place earlier than the tax switch is not the rela-
tively low level of T2, but the strong bargaining position. If ~~ W, we
have the opposite situation and the firm is in a strong bargaining posi-
tion. In this case the government will stick to its low tax rate during
the wllole planning period.
[insert table 6]
tiowcver, not for every Pareto-efficient solution there will be higher
employment as well as higher dividend than in the non-cooperative case.
This will only happen for some values of u(see figure 2).
[insert figure 2]
3.5. A further comparison between open-loop and feedback Stackelberg
At the moment, where the firm stops investing and starts paying out
dividend, its valuation of a marginal increase in the capítal good stock
falls below unity. Hence, for its decision the firm will compare the extra
stream of dividend in the future due to an extra dollar investment with
collecting this dollar as dividend now, i.e. an increase of the objective
function with one. The First term can be called present value of marginal
investment and if this value is the largest the firm continues investing,
otherwise the firm pays out dividend. Note that by calculating the margi-
nal stream of divideud the firm will explicitly take into account the-11-
expected tax policy by the government. Also the government makes a compa-
ríson: it has the choice between leaving one dollar in the firm for in-
vestment or collecting this dollar as tax. If the government leaves this
dollar in the firm, this has two effects. First the capital good stock
will increase and because of that there is more en,ployn,ent in the private
sector. Second, more capital goods will yield more tax earnings in the
future, so the employment created by the government in the future in-
creases. If the government collects this dollar, the amount of employees
in tlie public sector increases with W. So the choice between the high or
the low rate depends on the size of extra employment in the future due to
a dollar investment. Is it less than W, then the government will ask the
higli rate, otherwise it will ask the low rate. With other words we can say
that tYie clioice oF the tax policy depends on the effectivity of the em-
ployment policy.
We f'irst look at the situation of the feedback information structure.
1- -j-
If T2 ( plwa at the moment t giving one dollar to the firm has an
1~ -
eff'ect of ~ to the employn,ent level. After time-poir,t t, the government
raises the tax rate, but the firm still continues investment. At the
moment t the marginal earnings of u,arginal investment equals one and
1- ~-
thtret'oro thi~ firw .Switclrc~s tc the cli-viderid-pl,ase. If' TZ ~ plwa, the
lt -
w
firw invests and the government asks the low rate until t. At that time-
point t the firm stops investment and the government raises tax. However,
the valuation (in employment) oF the government of a marginal increase in
capitnl stock is still greater than W. The government wants more invest-
ment, because the extra employment due to one dollar investment is more
than W. In spite of this it cannot force the firm to continue investing.
And in the feedback case, at the nroment that the firm stops investment,
there is no incentive to ask the low rate.
In the situation of open-loop information structure the government will
manipulate its tax policy in such a direction, that at the switching mo-
ment from investment to dividend, the marginal employment created by a
margirial increase of' investment by the firm equals W. In the case that-12-
1- ~
22 C plwa, there is no reason for manipulating, because during the
lt -
w
firm's iirvestment the valuation of' the government already falls below 1
w'
1- ~
In the case that T2 ) plwa if the government announces a longer period
lt -
w
of low tax, i.e. t2 ~ t, (compared to the feedback case) the firm goes on
lo~iger with investment, i.e. tl ) t. The reason for this is that both
players will commit theirselves to their announced strategies. Therefore,
tfie government continues asking the low rate, even if the firm has stopped
investment. With other words the government chooses its optimal switch for
the tax policy in such a direction, that its employment policy is optimal.
1- -L
Note that in the case where T1 ~ plwa even sticking to the low tax rate
lt -
w
during the whole planning period is not enough to reach the point, where
marginal employment created by the firm equals W.
1- ~-
However, for i2 ~ piwa the open-loop solution is time-inconsistent
14 -
W
(e.g. Kydland and Prescott (19~~)). This means that there exists a s, t
r w w
such t.l~at T(t,s) x T(t,0), where T(t,s) is the optimal tax rate at time
t if the government makes a new plan at time s. In our problem it is easy
to w~derstand tliat iF the governwent has the possibility, at a moment
between tl and t2 (see table 3) to make a new initial plan, the high rate
is the plan. In general the firm has no reason to believe that the govern-
ment will stick to its initial plan, so open-loop Stackelberg is no longer
a useful concept. In thaL case the feedback Stackelberg concept can be
us~~ci. ln spit~~ cif the fact that Lhe outcowe in employment and in dividend
for the open-loop case is higher than for the feedback case. So for the
governuient it is better to play open-loop, but this makes only sense if
the firm believes the government. As pointed out in Gradus (1988) the
credibility of governmental policy plays an important role in the effecti-
vit`' cif it5 iiisLrwut.~iLs.-13-
4. Decreasing returns to scale
In this section we will assume that the firm operates under decreasing
returns to scale. Because we have fixed prices and wages, this decrease is
caused by the fact that the production function is homogeneous of degree
less than one. Furthermore, assume also now a Cobb-Douglas technology:
Q- KbL~; 5 t~ ~ 1; b, ,y ) 0 (21)
An iniportant implication of this assumption is that labour is no longer a
linear function of capital good stock:
1-~
~ b
P ~4 - w~ L- L(K) ' J w. K1-~ (22)
L' ) 0
L" ( 0
So if in this economy capital is increasing with, for example, lOx
labour will increase with less than 10;G.
[insert figure 3]




x(t) -(~) ~.K(t) 1-~ ; x' ) 0, x" C 0
(23)
(24)
So K, i.e. the capital to output coefficient, increases in time and the
economy becowes more and more capital-intensive (see also Van Loon
(1982)). He,ice, some substitution between labour and capital will take
place, but this substitution is not enough to bring labour at a lower
level. This situation could change if we introduce an imperfect output
market (see Lesourne and Leban (19~8)).-14-
In what way will the solution in the case of decreasing returns to
scale change in comparison with the solution in section 2? We focus our
interest on the feedback and open-loop Stackelberg solution. In the feed-
back Stackelberg solution the situation of table 1 and 2 still holds. If
1
a
T2 ( plwa we have table 1, otherwise table 2 will occur. However, the
14 -
W
time-points where the switches take place, will change. The switch from




t~ ) 0, tb ) 0, t b ) 0~
1-y
where q can be given by
~ 1
q- j P. (~) 1-`y - w. (~)1-y
(25)
(26)
it is easy to check, that if y t b- 1 then we have equation (15). Note
that if b~(1-~), which we can interpret as a measure of decreasing returns
to scale, approaches zero, t will also go to zero. In that case getting
more capital yields no advantage with respect to labour or dividend. How-
ever, the introduction of decreasing returns to scale has implications on
the effectivity of a low rate of corporate tax, but not on the dilemma of
creating jobs by the government or to let create jobs by the firm.
In the case of' open-loop Stackelberg not only the tiroe-points where the
differeut switclies will take place change but also the boundaries, which
tells us which type of solution takes place, change ( see figure 4).
[insert figure 4 here]
In the case of decreasing returns to scale there is an incentive for
the government to go on longer with asking the low rate. So, the impor-
tance of commitment will increase.-15-
5. A numerical example
The nature of the solutions examined may be further clarified by a
nume:rical exawple. 'I'he following paraweter values are chosen:
p- z, w- 1, x0 - 1. 'r - 4, T1 - 1~4. T2 - 1~2.
We havt: calculated the objective functions for the firm and the government
for the different solution concepts aaid taken into account four possible
situations of the technical parameters (see table 7)
a) b- 3~4, ,y - 1~4 (constant returns to scale, capital intensive)
b) b- I~2, ~- 1~2 (constant returns to scale, labour intensive)
c) b- 1~2, ,y - 1~4 (decreasing returns to scale, capital intensive)
d) b- 3~8, y- 1~4 ( decreasing returns to scale, labour intensive)
F'or tiie Yareto solution we distinguish two possible situations:
1
i) u T w, i.e. the government is in a strong bargainíng position
ii) ~~ ]. 1, i.e. ti~e firm is in a strong bargaining position.
w
[insert table ~ here]
In the first situation in the feedback case the firm stops investment
at time-point 2.32. In the open-loop situation by announcing a longer
period of low tax rate the firm continues investment until 2.80 and the
government postpones the application of the high rate until 3.58. As al-
ready mentioned in section 3.3, the open-loop solution yields higher
values of employment and dividend, but this is only credible if there are
reasons to believe that the government will stick to its initial plan.
Iri the second situation, where capital goods are less profitable, there
will be an earlier switch of investment in the Stackelberg game. However,
there is more employment in this economy, because the firm creates more
employment, i.e. al~xl ( a2~x2. Because of that in the OLS-solution there
is no switch of tax policy. Stickíng to the low rate is better. In the-16-
1-
a
case that T1 ~ plwa tlie OLS solution belongs to the set of Pareto-
lt -
w
efficient solution and equals the Pareto sclution with extreme bargaining
power for the firm.
This example also clarif'ies, that in the case of decreasing returns to
scale the switch f'rom investment to dividend will take place at a much
earlier time-point than in the case of constant returns to scale; the
intuition behind this is clear: capital goods are becoming less profit-
able. By decreasing returns to scale we have calculated the optimal solu-
tion for two different sets of parameter values, a capital intensive and a
labour intensive situation. Although the rentability of the capital good
stock is less in the second situation the switch will take place at a
later moment of time. The reason lies in the fact that bl t~-1 - 3~4 ~
sZ } ~r2 - 7~8.
6. Conclusions
One of the important policy issues nowadays is to try to lower the
level of unemployment. Confronted with a high level of unemployment the
government searches for an instrument to achieve this goal. In this paper
we focus our interest on the corporate tax rate as an instrument for the
government to lower the level of unemployment. For the effects on employ-
ment, it is important to distinguish between employment in the private and
in the public sector.
In this paper we present a theoretical model, where the government can
create jobs and where the firms employ people. In this model, which gives
a descriptio,i of aspects of governmental employment policies, government
and Firms ínteract through investment and tax policy. The government can
create more jobs in the public sector by raising the corporate tax rate,
but on the other hand a high level of corporate tax rate lowers the capi-
tal good stock and under certain assumptions also the level of unemploy-
ment. So there is a certain trade off between employment in the public
sector and employment in the private sector.
By assuming that the firms can be represented by one, we have a diffe-
rential game with two players: government and firm. In this differential-17-
game we studied different solution concepts (feedback and open-loop
Stackelberg and Pareto) and compared the results. An answer to the ques-
tion: "what is better to create jobs or to let them create?" depends on
the parameters of the model like a, i.e. the labour to output coefficient
of the private sector. Special attention is paid to the difference between
the open-loop Stackelberg, where both players sticks to their announced
policy, and the feedback Stackelberg. In general the open-loop solution
yields higher outcomes for both players, but it is only credible if there
are reasons to believe that the government will stick to its announced
policy. The main conclusion is that the credibility and reputation of
governmental policy can have a great influence on the outcome of the
model.
Of course, the analysis is in some sense partial. We did not analyse a
labour and output market and assume wage rate and output price to be
fixed. Also we can incorporate other tax and monetary instruments. These
areas will be subjects for future research.
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Appendix 1. The solution oP the model presented in section two:
We can rewrite the model presented in section 2 as follows:
-objective function government:
T
max. ó(X t 2(t)g)K(t)dt, 0~ T1( ~c(t) ( TZ~ 1
-objective function firm:
T
max. f(q(1-T(t))(1-u(t))K(t)dt, o ~ u(t) ~ 1,





K(t) - q(1-z(t))u(t)K(t), (p3)
where q is given by (8}.
As mentioned in section 2 the optimal level of employment by the firm is a
linear function of the capital good stock:
L(t) - KK(t) (A!{)
1.1. The feedback Stackelberg solution
The necessary conditions for a feedback Stackelberg solution are (see Basar
and Haurie (1985)):
there exists value functions V1(t,K) and V2(t,K) such that:
~V (t,K) ~V
- ~t - i E[Tl,i2]{(x } Tw)K(t) ~ 1Klq(1-T)y2(t.K)K} (A5)
~VZ(t,K)
max. ~V2
-~t - u E[0,1]{q(1-yl(t,K,u))(1-u)K(t) t ~Kq(1-y~l(t,K,u))uK} (A6)
~1(T.K(T)) - 0 (A7)
V2(T,K(T)) - 0 (A8)
~V ~V
(x { wl(t'K'u)w)K } c~K19Í1-yl(t,K,u))uK ~(K t 2W)K t~K1qÍ1-T)uK,
v 2 E[z1,TZ]. d u E[~.1],
where wl and y~2 are mappings such that
(A9)A2
wl'(t,K,u) ~ T(t) E [T1.T2] (A10)
w2:(t,K) ~ u(t) E [0,1] (All)
It would be straightforward to check that the following linear value
function is a solution of (A5)-(All):
Vi(t,K) - ~i(t).K , (A12)
where ~1 and a2 are given by:
A1- -K - TW - alU(1-T)9, ~1(T)-o (A13)
a2- -q(1-T)(1-u) - alu(1-T)q. a2(T)-0 (A14)
From (A4), (A5) and (All) follows that
~1(t.K.u) - z2 if 1-alu ) 0 (A15)
ál(t,K,u) - il if 1-alu ( 0 (A16)
ó2(t,K) - 1 if a2)1 (A17)
~2(t,K) - 0 if ~2(1 (A18)
So the open-loop Nash is a candidate for the feedback Stackelberg solution,
because al and ~2 are the same functions as the costate functions of the
open-loop Nash solution.
1.2. The open-loop Stackelberg solution
'The necessary conditions for an open-loop Stackelberg solution (T , u) are
(Wishart and Olsder (1979)):
H1(K, T, u. al, n) ) H1(K, T. u, ~1, rt), v t E[T1,T2] (A19)
H2(K, T, u, a2) ) H2(K, T, u, a2), d u E[0,1]
a 'q
a1- -K - TW - alu(1-~)q, al(T)-o
~2- -q(1-z)(1-u) - ~2u(1-t)q, ~2(T)-o






rt(0) - 0, (A24)
where II1 nnci 112, t.he Hnmi.ltonians are defined by
H1- (K t Tg)K t~1q(1-T)uK - n{q(1-t)(1-u)a~2u(1-T)q} (A25)
H2 - qK(1-T)(1-u) t a2qK(1-i)u (A26)
For the government's optimal tax rate we can derive
T1 if B(t) C 0
T(t) - ,
T2 if B(t) ) 0
where B(t)- (W-~lu)K t n{(1-u)ta2u}
Applying the results of Wishart and Olsder (1979) we csn evaluate the
(A27)
(A28)
costate variable n(t). The term á~ behaves with respect to time as a ó-
2
function with a jump at t- tl. The size of this jump is determined by the
properties of the b-function (see Wishart and Olsder (19~9)). So rt(t) will
be zero until the moment that the firm switches from investment to dividend
and will have a jump at t- t: 1
n(tl) - -~1(tl)K(tl) (A29)
so that
B(tl) - (W - ~1(tl))K(tl) ~ 0 if
~1(tl) ) w
It depends on the value of ~1(tl), which policy will be chosen. We have
three possible situations:
-1) ~1(tl) C W~ T(t) - T2, t) tl
1- a





From the transversality condition tl can be derived, which is the same as
in the feedback situation.
-2) al(tl) ) W~ t(t) - T1. t) tl (A31)A4
1- a
This will happen if T1) --~ Wa.
1}-
W
In the text we replace tl by tl to clearify the difference between
situation two and three.
-3) ~1(tl) - W~ T(t) - T1, tl ~ t C t2
- T2 , t2 C t C T
1- a 1-
This situation will occur if T1C ~ and T2) ~Wa
lt- lt- w w
(A32)
The time-points tl and t2 can be derived from the system al(tl)-W and
a2(tl)-1, which contains two unknown variables and two equations ( see also
Gradus (1988)).
The conditions for the open-loop Stackelberg solution are not only
necessary but also sufficient because of the fact that the maximized
Hamiltonians are linear with respect to the state variable.
1.3. The Pareto solution
To find the Pareto-solution we have to maximize J- Jlt uJ2, 0 C u C m
subject to ( A3), where N measures the relative importance of player 1
against player 2 and is assumed to be given. This is a standard optimal
control problem, which is easy to solve. We give no details about the
derivation. The time-points in table 6 and 7 can be given by:
t -
Nxw
wa f T1(P-wa) t uw(p-wa)(1-T1) (A33)
uxw
t- wa t T2( p-wac) t y.~w(p-wa) (1-T2) (A34)
` 1 watT2(p-woc) 1 watT2(p-wa)




Appendix 2. the solution of the model presented in section 4
We have only derived the feedback and open-loop Stackelberg solution.
2.1. The feedback solution
Again the open-loop Nash solution is a candidate for the feedback
r r
Stackelberg solution. The solution (ul, u2) for the OLN-problem is easy to
derive. The necessary conditions are:
. r ~
H1(K, T, u, al) ~ H1(K, T . u,~1). v 2 E[T1,22] (A36)
. . .
H2(K, T, u, a2) ~ H2(K, T, u, ~2), b' u E[0,1]
M
a1- -(K t W)áK - alu~(1-T~)~, al(T)-o
a2- -(1-T~)(1-u~)áK - alu~(1-T~)áK, a2(T)-o.
where H1 and H2, the Hamiltonians are defined by





H2 - (1-T)(1-u)0(K) t ~2(1-T)u0(K) (A41)
~
0(K) - qKl-S, where q is given by (26)
2.2. The open-loop Stackelberg solution
The necessary conditions for the open-loop Stackelberg solution (Y, u) in
the case of decreasing returns to scale:
H1(K, i, u, al, rt) ~ H1(K. i. u, J~1. rt). v T E[t1,T2]
H2(K, T, u, a2) ~ H2(K, T, u, ~2), d u E[0,1]
2
a1- -(K . W)áK - alu(1-T)~ - na o(1-T)(1-u), al(T)-o
dK
~2- -áx(i-T)(1-u) - a2u(1-T)áx~ ~2(T)-o







"(~) - o' (A~}7)
where H1 and H2, the Hamiltonians are defined by
H1- (K t W)~(K) t~1(1-T)u0(K) - rt~(1-u.~2u)(1-T) (A48)
H2 - (1-T)(1-u)0(K) t a2(1-~C)u0(K) (A49)
In the same way as in 1.2. we can evaluate the costate variable n(t).
The time-points tl and t2 are
B(1-21) - ~(T1{~) - h(1-T1)
T- t2-
g(i2-T1)(W(1 ~ t 1)) (A5o)
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Table 2. The FBS solution (if T2C Piwa)
1 t -
w
1 - a 1 - a
Table 3. The OLS solution (if il( plwa ~d i2~ Piwx)
1 t - 1 . - w w
a
Table 4. The OLS solution (if T1) plwa)
1 t -
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Table 5. The Pareto-solution (if 0 t u C 1)
w
Table 6. The Pareto-solution 1) (if u ~
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Table 7. A numerical example
Figure 2. The optimal trajectories of capital and labour
Figure 3. The value of the objective functions by different solution
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t E [t ,T]
0
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FBS I--OLS I Pareto
I---------I--------------- -----------------------------
I a I K I J1 I J2 I t I J1 I J2 I tl I t2 I J1 I J2 I t
-------------t----t----~----t----t----t----t----t----t----t----t----t----
~-314. b-i~4~ 0.5~ 1.3~18.6~ 7.9~ 2-3I19-7I11.5I 2-7~ 3.6~27.7~io.2~ 3.4
------------------t----f----t----}----.----t----t----t----}----t----t----t
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I I23.9I15-2I ~
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